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Kooverjee v Kooverjee

 

 

Division:

Cape Of Good Hope Provincial Division

Date:

10 May 2006

Case No:

7933/03

Before:

Fortuin AJ

Judgment

man & woman yelling

FORTUIN AJ:

The history of the marriage

[1]

Plaintiff and defendant were married to each other, in community of property on 28 October 1985, and the marriage subsists. Two children were born of the marriage, namely N, a boy aged 12 and a girl, D, aged 14. These were the ages of the children at the time when the summons was issued in 2003.

[2]

Plaintiff instituted divorce proceedings on 23 September 2003 claiming the following:

“a.

decree of divorce;

b.

an order conferring custody of the two minor children on plaintiff, subject to defendant being entitled to reasonable access to the children at all reasonable times; and

c.

forfeiture of the benefits arising from the marriage in community of property.”

[3]

Defendant delivered her claim in reconvention during March 2004 in which she claimed the following:

“a.

a decree of divorce;

b.

joint guardianship of the two minor children;

c.

custody of the children subject to plaintiff’s right of reasonable access;

d.

an order that plaintiff shall maintain the children as set out below until they complete their tertiary education or become self-supporting, whichever event occurs last:

  i

plaintiff shall pay to defendant the sum of R4 000 per month per child, on or before the first day of every month by way of debit order into such account as defendant may nominate from time to time;

 ii

plaintiff shall bear the cost of all expenditure in respect of medical, dental, surgical, hospital, orthodontic and ophthalmological treatment needed by the children, including any sums payable to a physiotherapist, occupational therapist, speech therapist, practitioner of holistic medicine, psychiatrist/psychologist and chiropractor, the cost of medication and the provision where necessary of spectacles and/or contact lenses;

iii

plaintiff shall pay the entire educational costs in respect of the children. Educational costs shall include, but not be limited to, all school fess and additional tuition fees, the cost of school outings, camps and the cost of school lunches, the cost of extra-curricular school and sport activities and the cost of all extramural activities in which they participate, including the cost of club fees and school tours (including travel and accommodation expenses related thereto), as well as the cost of all school books, stationery, school funding requirements, school uniforms, equipment and attire (including computers) relating to their education and the sporting and/or extramural activities engaged in by them;

iv

if the children have the necessary aptitude for tertiary education, plaintiff shall bear the cost of their tertiary education: such costs shall include, but not be limited to, the cost of all university and residence fees (and/or fees due to an institution of higher learning) attended by the children, and the cost of all books, stationery and equipment (including the cost of computers), required for their tertiary education as well as their reasonable transport and travelling costs;

e.

An order directing plaintiff to maintain defendant personally as set out below until her death or remarriage:

  i

plaintiff shall pay to defendant the sum of R5 000 per month on or before the first day of every month by way of debit order into such bank account as defendant may nominate from time to time;

 ii

plaintiff shall bear the costs of all expenditure in respect of medical, dental, surgical, hospital orthodontic and ophthalmological treatment required by defendant, including any sums payable to a physiotherapist, occupational therapist, speech therapist, practitioner of holistic medicine, psychiatrist/psychologist and chiropractor, the cost of prescribed medicine, the provision where necessary of spectacles and/or contact lenses and plaintiff shall cover defendant on a comprehensive medical aid scheme;

iii

plaintiff shall pay the removal costs incurred by defendant in respect of her relocation to her new home, as well as the telephone and electricity installation costs.

iv

every five years, on the anniversary date of the parties’ divorce, plaintiff shall provide defendant with a new substitute motor vehicle having a current market value of R150 000 (which amount is to be escalated in accordance with the formula in prayer (f) below) and he shall pay the reasonable repair and maintenance costs, including the replacement of tyres and premiums for comprehensive insurance cover in respect of defendant’s motor vehicle as well as the annual AA membership fee;

f.

The amounts payable in terms of d(i) and e(i) shall be reviewed annually on the first day of February each year commencing on 1 February 2005 and increased in accordance with such rise as has occurred in the Consumer Price Index for the Republic of South Africa based on the 12 urban areas as reflected in the all income group (Cape Peninsula) for a period of one year expiring on the last day of January in each preceding year;

g.

Division of the joint estate;

h.

In the event of the net value of defendant’s half share of the joint estate being less than R850 000 on divorce, plaintiff shall in addition to prayers (d), (e) and (f), maintain the children and defendant personally, for the aforementioned periods, as set out below:

  i.

plaintiff shall pay the sum of R100 000 to defendant on date of divorce in order to enable defendant to equip and furnish a home for her and the children;

 ii.

plaintiff shall contribute to defendant and the children’s accommodation costs by paying defendant an amount of R6 000 per month (from date of divorce), on or before the first day of every month towards the mortgage bond instalments in respect of the home she and the children may occupy from time to time;

iii

On divorce, plaintiff shall provide defendant with a new motor vehicle having a current market value of R150 000.”

[4]

On 19 October 2004, a conference was held in terms of rule 37 where the following issues were listed as important in the action:

a.

division of the joint estate;

b.

maintenance for the two children born of the marriage; and

c.

personal maintenance for the defendant.

[5]

During this conference it was anticipated that expert evidence would be led with regard to the financial portfolio of the plaintiff.

[6]

By agreement, this matter was set down for hearing in fourth division on 27 October 2005.

[7]

A further conference was held in terms of rule 37 on 25 October 2005 where it was recorded that the following issues remained in dispute:

a.

the quantum of maintenance for defendant and the minor children;

b.

whether defendant is entitled to permanent maintenance or rehabilitative maintenance. Plaintiff being of the view that defendant is only entitled to rehabilitative maintenance whilst defendant seeks an order for permanent maintenance; and

c.

both parties agreed that a Receiver will be appointed in order to determine the value of the joint estate and the distribution of the assets between the parties.

[8]

It is important to note that the plaintiff instituted action against the two defendants during 2003, but the action against the second defendant was withdrawn on 19 July 2005.

[9]

Plaintiff’s counsel made the following submissions:

“1.

On 3 August 2004 at the Rule 43 proceeding, the parties entered into an order by agreement as made.

2.

After the agreement had been reached, plaintiff’s representatives approached defendant’s representatives with an alternate proposal that plaintiff would give defendant interim occupation pendente lite of a house in York Road.

3.

Plaintiff further informed defendant that the house was at the time tenanted and a rental income of approximately R3 000 per month was being received.

4.

Plaintiff informed defendant further that if defendant would accept occupation of the house in York Road, this would be on condition that plaintiff’s earlier agreed maintenance obligation of R10 000 would be reduced by R3 000 to R7 000.”

[10]

The disputes are more patrimonial than matrimonial in nature. The provisions of section 7 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, as amended by section 36 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, which deals with the division of assets and maintenance of parties are applicable. Section 7(2) [Act 70 of 1979] in particular, is applicable as it deals with the factors to be taken into account when maintenance by the one party to the other is claimed and where there is no agreement between the parties.

[11]

The following factors may be taken into account when a divorce court considers a maintenance order:1

11.1

the existing or prospective means of each of the parties;

11.2

their respective earning capacities;

11.3

financial needs and obligations;

11.4

their age and the duration of the marriage;

11.5

standard of living prior to the divorce;

11.6

their conduct insofar as it may be relevant to the breakdown of the marriage;

11.7

an order for the division of assets; and

11.8

any other factor.

11.9

The existing and prospective means of the parties

11.9.1

From the evidence it is clear that the plaintiff has a stable and regular income. He owns property and drives an expensive car. It is also evident that his lifestyle, which seems to be the same before and after his separation from the defendant, is funded from the family business. There is no evidence that he lacks any financial resources to fund his comfortable lifestyle.

11.9.2

The defendant has a meagre income and it is clear from the evidence that she does not have the means to maintain herself and her two children without the assistance of the plaintiff.

11.9.3

Plaintiff attempted to persuade this Court that he is not a man of considerable means. He also testified that before the rule 43 application, where he was ordered to pay R10 000 per month to defendant, he lived “beyond his means”.

11.9.4

During cross-examination, plaintiff, inter alia, indicated that he was not aware of his part-ownership of the property situated at 23 Park Road, Wynberg.

11.9.5

The plaintiff was vague and at times not forthcoming with the Court about his means. No evidence was adduced to show that his business is suffering any financial loss or will in the near future suffer any loss.

11.9.6

On evaluating the defendant’s evidence concerning her means, she was clearly frank. She went so far as to make concessions with regard to her ability to earn more money.

11.10

Their respective earning capacities

11.10.1

Our courts have applied the “clean break” principle after divorce for many years. The aim of this principle is to ensure that the parties, after >divorce, become economically independent of each other as soon as possible. This principle, however, has to be applied with due consideration of the particular circumstances of each case.

>11.10.2

>The earning capacities of the parties are of particular importance in this case as the real dispute relates to whether the defendant should receive permanent or rehabilitative maintenance. Plaintiff disputed defendant’s capacity to earn and what contribution she would be able to make towards her personal maintenance. Plaintiff contended that she is a competent and capable woman and that she is an experienced beautician and reflexologist. He argued that she would be able to generate an income within twelve months of the divorce.

11.10.3

The defendant did not indicate that she did not want to work after the divorce. It was her evidence that she would, as she did during her marriage and after her separation from plaintiff, continue to work as a beautician to contribute towards her personal maintenance. The question is whether her earning capacity would be sufficient.

11.10.4

Her testimony is that she is not able to devote sufficient time to her business to make it more profitable when she bears the primary responsibility of caring for their two children. She can accordingly only work part-time.

11.10.5

It is evident that as long as the defendant is responsible for the caring of her two children, she will not be able to expand her business and her income will not increase dramatically. I am of the view that she requires financial assistance so that she may in the long term devote more time to her business. If the family continue to have the quality of life to which they are accustomed, she has to continue to be the primary care-giver for their children.

11.10.6

As the defendant has in the past and at present been the primary care-giver, it is not in the best interest of the

Page 375 of [2006] 4 All SA 369 (C)

children to alter the status quo. This Court is very aware of the dangers of stereotyping the mothering role of women and the Court is cautious not to reinforce these roles. It is, however, important to note that the de facto roles of women in society today cannot be ignored and that forcing a model of formal equality onto our society, may just reinforce the existing unequal roles and hamper the achievement of true and substantive equality.

11.10.7

Mr Stephens, on behalf of the plaintiff, argued inter alia that the Court should consider the “so-called emancipation of women”. This Court takes the actual emancipation of women very seriously and did therefore consider the aim of the equality clause in our Constitution.2  The aim of the equality clause can surely not be to disregard past inequalities and thereby contribute to the continued discrimination of one of the previously disadvantaged categories of persons in our society, eg women.

11.10.7.1

The discussion on the aim of the equality clause entrenched in our constitution by O’Regan J in President of the RSA and another v Hugo3  is important:

“There is no doubt that the goal of equality entrenched in our Constitution would be better served if the responsibilities for child rearing were more fairly shared between fathers and mothers. The simple fact of the matter is that at present they are not nor are they likely to be more evenly shared in the near future. For the moment, then, and for some time to come, mothers are going to carry greater burdens than fathers in the rearing of children. We cannot ignore this fact . . .”

11.10.8

When this Court considers the issue of equality, it is substantive equality that is envisaged. A similar interpretation of section 9(2) of the Constitution was given by Ackermann J in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice:4

“Substantive equality is envisaged when section 9(2) unequivocally asserts that equality includes “the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms”.

11.10.9

The term “substantive equality” has also been discussed in other judgments. In Daniels v Campbell NO and others5  Sachs J said the following:

“The value of non-sexism is foundational to our Constitution and requires a hard look at the reality of the lives that women have been compelled to lead by law and legally-backed social practices. This, in turn, necessitates acknowledging the constitutional goal of achieving substantive equality between men and women. The reality has been and still in large measure continues to be that in our patriarchal culture men find it easier than women to receive income and acquire property”.

11.10.10

Substantive equality was also discussed by Langa DCJ (as he then was) in Bhe and others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and others (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae); Shibi v Sithole and others; SA Human Rights Commission and another v President of RSA and another:6

“Not only is the achievement of equality one of the found-ing values of the Constitution, section 9 of the Constitu-tion also guarantees the achievement of substantive equality to ensure that the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of an egalitarian and non-sexist society is available to all, including those who have been subjected to unfair discrimination in the past”.

11.10.11

When this Court therefore considers the earning capacity of the two parties, the “emancipation of women” is a very important factor. This Court, however, also takes into account the fact that the division of roles in families, influence not only the past earning capacity of the parties, but also their future earning capacities. For a discussion of this view, see the article entitled Labours of Love: Child custody and the division of matrimonial property at 7  of which the following quotation is an extract:

“A legal reluctance to order maintenance for working women who are considered able to support themselves not only entails, therefore, a refusal to compensate them for past diminution in earning power, but fails to account for loss of earning power which inevitably attaches to post-divorce custody.”

11.10.12

In casu, in addition to the constitutional interpretation of equality, the parties are also entitled to a clean break and not to be financially dependent on each other indefinitely. In the circumstances the following factors are considered to be pertinent:

i.

Defendant is currently earning a meagre income from her business.

ii.

This income is not sufficient to maintain her and her children.

iii.

She is currently responsible for the care of the two children.

iv.

Changing this status quo before both of the children become independent would be too drastic a change and would not be in the best interest of the children.

v.

Until the children become independent, defendant would not be in a position to devote more time to her business.

vi.

Defendant should be empowered in more ways than one so that she may advance her business interests and attend to her children. Defendant ought to be afforded an opportunity to expand her business so that she could become more and more self-sufficient, especially once her children become independent.

vii.

The aim of rehabilitative maintenance is to afford a spouse extra time and resources to enable her/him to become financially self-sufficient. I am of the view that the required result, ie the ultimate self-sufficiency of defendant, will be achieved by way of rehabilitative maintenance.

viii.

The amount and period awarded should make provision for defendant’s current investment of time in her parental responsibilities, with this allocation progressively decreasing as both of her children become less dependent on her. The ultimate aim of such an award would be that the amount would reduce in such a way that it ultimately disappears when she is able to spend all of her time on her business, ie when both her children are completely independent.

ix.

This Court is very aware of the fact that our courts in the past, awarded rehabilitative maintenance for between six months and eighteen months.8  I am, however, of the view that a proper analysis of the rationale behind the awarding of rehabilitative maintenance will conclude that an arbitrary period for the payment of rehabilitative maintenance will not address the ultimate achievement of self-sufficiency. I am firmly of the view that a longer period of rehabilitative maintenance, ie longer than eighteen months,9  is justified in these circumstances.

x.

The decision of Mullins J in Pommerel v Pommerel10  is supported where it is stated that:

“A woman’s ability to earn income does not per se, in my view, disentitle the Court from ordering her former husband to pay for her maintenance.”

I am of the view that this argument is also relevant in the determination of the period for which rehabilitative maintenance is awarded.

11.10.13

I am also in agreement with the view of Mullins J in Pommerel v Pommerel11  and applied in Pillay v Pillay12  that the rule that no maintenance should be awarded to an ex-wife who could support herself, is not a hard and fast principle in our law. Mullins J was further of the view that the “reasonableness or otherwise of her decision not to work must be considered.

11.10.14

I have considered the reasonableness of defendant’s decision not to devote more time to her career and have found that her decision to divide her time between her business and her children is reasonable and in their best interests. Plaintiff’s earning capacity is undoubtedly better than defendant’s.

11.11

Financial needs of the parties

11.11.1

The parties provided the Court with income and expenditure statements. For the purpose of the discussion of the financial needs of the parties, I will now turn to the expenses listed by each one of them. A comparison of the two statements show that defendant requires approximately R23 000 for herself and her two children, while plaintiff uses approximately R33 000 for himself, R10 000 of which is for maintenance of the defendant and the two children. Plaintiff, on his own version, uses approximately R23 000 for himself. The defendant is very conservative in the calculation of her needs when one considers that the sum is spent on three persons as opposed to the plaintiff spending an equal amount on one person.

11.12

The age of the parties and the duration of the marriage

11.12.1

Even though these two factors are listed separately in the Act, the Court will discuss them together. The way in which these factors were applied in the past, presents with some difficulty. Their ages, in my view, are relevant only for ascertaining their earning capacities. The plaintiff’s capacity to earn is not hampered by the separation, while the defendant’s has been impeded. Defendant invested a huge amount of her time in supporting the plaintiff while he was expanding his business. This meant that she was not able to invest more time in her own business. The marriage endured for 18 years prior to the separation. Defendant’s capacity to advance her business interests was effectively limited for most of the 18 years.

11.13

Standard of living prior to the divorce

11.13.1

There is no doubt that the parties maintained a high standard of living. They lacked nothing during their marriage. They travelled abroad on family holidays. The children attended movies and the family was able to eat out regularly. The plaintiff maintained that he drove inexpensive cars at the beginning of their marriage and that he progressed slowly to slightly more expensive cars towards the end of their marriage. He is currently driving a very expensive car. Defendant, on the other hand, is driving a seven-year-old car. Defendant correctly pointed out that she will need Automobile Association membership, because she will be driving around as a single mother, without the support of physical assistance after the divorce. She will clearly need the assurance that she will be assisted when her car breaks down.

11.13.2

It is accepted in our law that both parties cannot expect that the same standard of living will endure after the di-vorce where it is financially not possible. It is, however, important to establish whether it is possible in each matter to maintain that same standard of living.13  In Grasso v Grasso14  a clear exception was made with due regard to the means of the parties. I am of the view that the parties in casu are able to maintain the same standard of living post-divorce.

11.44

Conduct of the parties insofar as it may be relevant to the breakdown of the marriage

11.14.1

At the outset, it must be stressed that this factor will not be discussed as a means of punishment for the misconduct of any party. This is particularly so since the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, no longer provides for divorce based on fault.15

11.14.2

Conduct as a factor in the award of maintenance was discussed in detail in Swart v Swart.16  In Swart, Flemming J raised the issue of adultery and desertion being, in certain cases, “symptoms, not causes of a marriage breakdown; and also that conduct which could not be considered to be morally very blameworthy, such as refusal to engage in conversation, might be a factor leading to marriage breakdown”.17

11.14.3

The approach of Flemming J in the Swart case (supra) that the view that both parties are usually to blame for the breakdown of a marriage, results in a more fluid and equitable approach, is in my view, the desired one. In ultimately determining the question at hand, I will consider what is just and equitable in the circumstances.

11.15

An order for the division of the assets

11.15.1

Section 7(2) of the Divorce Act lists an order in terms of section 7(3) as a factor that the Court may take into account. Because section 7(3) deals with marriages out of community of property, there was no need for me to consider this as a factor.

11.16

Any other factor

11.16.1

Section 7(2) of the Divorce Act gives the Court a wide discretion to take into account the factors which I have referred to above as well as any other factor which in the opinion of the Court should be taken into account.

11.16.2

I have taken into account that the defendant has been frank with the Court with regard to her financial needs, as well as her means. I remain unpersuaded that plaintiff has shown, on a balance of probabilities, that he has limited means. Plaintiff is clearly disingenuous in advancing this argument.

11.16.3

The plaintiff, when he was asked by defendant for money for a pair of school shoes, he refused. This refusal is shocking when one considers that he is part-owner of a successful business that imports luxury footwear.

11.16.4

Evidence was led by both sides on the patriarchal nature of an Indian marriage. This was not disputed by the plaintiff and he, in fact argued that, because of the patriarchal nature of his Indian family, he left most of the financial decisions to his brother. I am not passing a moral judgment on the patriarchal nature of Indian family life. The evidence led in this case on this issue was however taken into account as an additional factor in determining whether maintenance is payable to the defendant personally, ie that the parties in this marriage lived in a traditional Indian family where patriarchal principles were adhered to.

[12]

Calculating the amount of maintenance

12.1

As stated earlier, defendant showed that she needs R14 764 towards the maintenance of her children and R8 860 towards her personal maintenance. I am of the view that these are their reasonable needs. The issue to be determined is whether the plaintiff can afford to make up the deficit, being approximately R19 000.

12.2

Plaintiff submitted an income and expenditure statement, stating that his income (before tax) was R15 000. In this statement his expenditure is stated as R33 139 with a note that the deficit is funded by way of a loan account in the Babu’s Footwear Store Sea Point CC.

12.3

Nowhere in his financial statements is there any indication that the loan(s) from the business is/are being repaid by the plaintiff. The Court takes this into account and accepts that this loan(s) is/are not currently repayable.

12.4

If the plaintiff, on a monthly basis, has R33 139 available for his own expenses (R10 000 currently towards maintenance for the defendant and children), it is clear that he will be able to afford to pay maintenance towards both the children and the defendant.

[13]

Costs

13.1

Section 10 of the Divorce Act18  and provides that:

“In a divorce action the court shall not be bound to make an order for costs in favour of the successful party, but the court may, having regard to the means of the parties, and their conduct in so far as it may be relevant, make such order as it considers just, and the court may order that the costs of the proceedings be apportioned between the parties.”

13.2

I have taken into account that the postponement requested by the defendant on 4 August 2005 was due to her being insufficiently prepared. The cost of the postponement for that day should be borne by the defendant.

[14]

In the circumstances, I make the following order:

14.1

A decree of divorce is granted.

14.2

Division of the joint estate.

14.3

Custody of the two minor children born of the parties is awarded to defendant with right of reasonable access to plaintiff.

Maintenance for the children:

14.4

Plaintiff is ordered to pay maintenance for each child in the amount of R4 000 (four thousand rand) per month per child until they complete their tertiary education or become self-supporting, which-ever event occurs first.

14.5

Plaintiff shall bear the cost of all expenditure in respect of medical, dental, surgical, hospital, orthodontic and opthalmological treatment needed by the children, including any sums payable to a physiotherapist, occupational therapist, speech therapist, practitioner of holistic medicine, psychiatrist/psychologist and chiropractor, the cost of medication and the provision where necessary of spectacles and/or contact lenses.

14.6

Plaintiff shall pay the entire educational costs in respect of the children. Educational costs shall include, but not be limited to, all school fees and additional tuition fees, the cost of school outings, camps, the cost of extra-curricular school and sport activities and the cost of all extramural activities in which they participate, including the cost of club fees and school tours (including travel and accommodation expenses related thereto), as well as the cost of all school books, stationery, school funding requirements, school uniforms, equipment and attire (including computers) relating to their education and the sporting and/or extramural activities engaged in by them.

14.7

If the children have the necessary aptitude for tertiary education, plaintiff shall bear the cost of their tertiary education: such costs shall include, but not be limited to, the cost of all university and residence fees (and/or fees due to an institution of higher learning) attended by the children, and the cost of all books, stationery and equipment (including the cost of computers), required for their tertiary education as well as their reasonable transport and travelling costs.

Maintenance for defendant:

14.8

Plaintiff is ordered to pay rehabilitative maintenance to the defendant until both children have completed their tertiary education, alternatively until both children become self-supporting, alternatively for a period of 10 (ten) years, whichever event occurs first, in the following manner:

14.8.1

R5 000 (five thousand rand) per month for years 1 and 2;

14.8.2

R4 000 (four thousand rand) per month for years 3 and 4;

14.8.3

R3 000 (three thousand rand) per month for years 5 and 6;

14.8.4

R2 000 (two thousand rand) per month for years 7 and 8; and

14.8.5

R1 000 (one thousand rand) per month for years 9 and 10.

14.9

Plaintiff shall pay the removal costs incurred by defendant in respect of her relocation to her new home, as well as telephone and electricity installation costs.

14.10

Plaintiff shall bear the costs of all expenditure in respect of medical, dental, surgical, hospital, orthodontic and opthalmological treatment required by defendant, including any sums payable to a physiotherapist, occupational therapist, speech therapist, practitioner of holistic medicine, psychiatrist/psychologist and chiropractor, the cost of prescribed medication, the provision where necessary of spectacles and/or contact lenses for a period of five (5) years from date of divorce. Plaintiff shall bear 50% (fifty percent) of the above costs for years 6–10 from date of divorce. Plaintiff shall cover defendant on a comprehensive medical aid scheme for a period of 5 (five) years from date of divorce. Plaintiff shall bear 50% (fifty percent) of the costs of a similar medical aid scheme for years 6–10 from date of divorce.

14.11

Plaintiff’s claims insofar as they do not accord with what is contained in this order, are dismissed.

14.12

Defendant’s counter-claim, in so far as it does not accord with what is contained in this order, is dismissed.

14.13

Plaintiff is ordered to pay defendant’s costs, save for the costs of the postponement on 4 August 2005, which costs shall be borne by the defendant.

[15]

The amounts payable in terms of 14.4 and 14.8 shall be increased annually on the first day of May of each year commencing on 1 May 2007 in accordance with such rise as has occurred in the Consumer Price Index for the Republic of South Africa based on the twelve urban areas as reflected in the Middle Income Group (Cape Peninsula) for a period of 1 (one) year expiring on the last day of April in each preceding year.

For the plaintiff:

DA Stephens, instructed by Aubrey Katzeff Attorneys

For the defendant:

BC Hack, instructed by Samuels Attorneys, Cape Town

 

 

 


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